PBA Murr vs Wisconsin Case Analysis

PBA Murr vs Wisconsin Case AnalysisAdem MehmetajI. The question organism asked is should cardinal de jure distinct but commonly owned adjacent slews of land be combined for sphere analysis purposes? Joseph P. Murr and his family bought 2 scores approximately the analogous size and at different times. The exsert before us is that Murr no longer wishes to hold one of the wads and St. Croix overshadows that he is not allowed to allot only one of the separate refer adequate to(p) to environmental concerns. Petitioners claim that state and federal courts are in secure conflict with respect to the issue at hand and pay heed numerous cases in an attempt to derive support for their proposition. Those cases as nearly as the examples provided below all involve different facts and circumstances. They confirm that a flexible, ad hoc, approaching has consistently been used by the lower courts to define the pertinent property and to determine whether compensation is due. The W isconsin appellate court determined that because the dickens lots are contiguous, and happen to be owned by the same people, this Courts parcel as a hale precept from Penn Central requires combination the ii parcels for pickingss analysis. From the Murrs perspective, skunks E and F are two tell parcels, created as legally separate lots, taxed separately, and purchased separately. The lots were never highly-highly-developed together, and were purchased for completely different reasons. Nevertheless, because the Murrs own two parcels, the Wisconsin court ruled that these two parcels combined were the Murrs parcel as a whole. This conclusion was driven by the contiguous ownership.II. The parents of Joseph P. Murr and his siblings (the Murrs) purchased two adjacent lots (Lots E and F) in St. Croix County in 1960. The two lots together made up approximately .98 acres. In 1994 and 1995 respectively, the Murrs parents transferred Lot F and Lot E to their children. In 1995, the two lots were merged pursuant to St. Croix Countys code of formulas. The relevant commandment prohibits the individualist maturement or sale of adjacent lots chthonic common ownership, unless an individual lot was at least one acre. The ordinance further stipulate that if each lot is not at least one acre, the lots may be measured together to equal one acre. 7 years later, the Murrs wanted to sell Lot E and not Lot F. The St. Croix County venire of Adjustment denied the Murrs application to sell the lots separately. The Murrs sued the state and county and claimed the ordinance in question entrusted in an uncompensated pickings of their property and take them of all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E because the lot cannot be sold or developed as a separate lot. The turn court granted heavyset judgement to the state and county. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin confirm and held that the Murrs were not deprived of their practical use of the property. Nevertheless, Petit ioners submitted their plan to the St. Croix County Board for consideration. The Board denied their plan and refused to make an exception to the longstanding regulations. Instead of modifying the plan or submitting a less-intrusive plan that complied with the existing regulations Petitioners filed this uprightness causal agent alleging a regulatory taking. The imperious Court confirmed the parcel as a whole rule in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, where coal operators take a firm stand that a court should only consider the coal that could not be mined to determine whether a state law requiring them to leave a certain amount of coal in the ground amounted to a regulatory taking. The dictatorial Court again endorsed the parcel as a whole rule in concrete Pipe Products, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust. There, Concrete Pipe claimed that a regulatory taking occurred when federal law essential it to pay withdrawal liability to a pension trust. In 2 006, the Murrs brought suit in St. Croix County Circuit Court, which ruled against them and affirmed the Zoning Boards decision denying the naval division to sell or use the two lots as separate building sites. The Murrs claim that since Lot E and F were created as legally separate lots purchased separately for different purposes and taxed separately, they should also be able to sell them separately. The Murrs reject the claim that Penn Central v City of juvenile York1 established a rule stating that two legally distinct properties should be considered as contiguous parcels. Under Penn Central, to determine whether a particular establishment action has accomplished a taking, courts are to focus both on the guinea pig of the action and on the nature and extent of the right baulk with rights in the parcel as a whole. 2 On appeal in 2011, the Wisconsin State appellant Court once again upheld the boards decision. It held that the two lots are contiguous and also happen to be owned by the same people, so implementing the Courts parcel as a whole rule from Penn Central does in fact require combining the two parcels for takings analysis. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals rejected the petitioners notion that the lots had not merged as a result of the Grandfather clause because the lots were already subject to the 1976 environmental regulation when they had been merged under joint ownership in 1995. The Appellate Court ruled that it was not a taking because the Murrs property, interpreted as a whole, could be used for residential purposes, among some other things. 3 The traffic circle court had also stated that a year-round residence could be built on top of the bluff and the residence could be rigid entirely on Lot E, entirely on Lot F, or could straddle both lots. 4III. The offspring Clause of the U.S. Constitution states simply nor shall closed-door property be interpreted for public use, without just compensation. However, that clause has interpreted on a distinguished role in constitutional jurisprudence, notably with relation to the boundaries of state and native restrictive power. Any discussion of the Takings Clause ought to begin with the history that led to its enactment and therefore the approach case law has developed. The Takings Clause found its origin in Section 39 of the Magna Carta, which declared that land would not be taken without some form of due bear upon No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in every way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the rule-governed judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. The Fifth Amendment was solely a restriction against the central. Whereas there have been some limits on the powers of the States before 1865, the obliging War caused the federal government to restrict the powers of the state governments against their own voters through with(predicate) the passage of the Thirteenth, 14th, and Fifteenth Amendments. The Fourteenth Amendment created restrictions to the States through imputable Process clause. The Due Process Clause gradually shifted. One shift was procedural and was developed to assure that hearings and alternative governmental decision-making processes were conducted fairly. This review of the processes of government is understood as procedural due process of law. A second line of cases broaden the boundaries on the federal government within the Bill of Rights to state and local anesthetic government action exploiting the Due Process Clause. For roughly one light speed years after the passage of the post-Civil War amendments, The Due Process Clause judicial proceeding resulted in incorporation of a number of the restrictions on the federal government within the Bill of Rights to state and local actions moreover. The Supreme Court applied the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause in Chicago Burlington and Quincy R.R . v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). outset with Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), during which the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that that Court may review, through the due process of law Clause, the substance of ordinance. To review both the procedure as well as the substance of legislation can be referred to as substantive due process. This part of the Due Process Clause allows judges to promise state and local legislative decisions. Under substantive due process, a court may verify whether or not the ends and involves of legislation were acceptable and whether or not the legislation was unduly oppressive to modulate parties.In Kelo v. city of new London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (June 23, 2005), the question arose on whether or not the utilization of eminent domain alone for economic development purposes may be a valid public use. Any regulations placed on ones property does indeed infringe on their right of land. That does not mean however it can be deemed a taking. Taki ngs Clause is tricky, because it is not always clear what is a taking and what is not. The unclear interpretation of what a takings is expected to remain in an unpredictable path.IV. St. Croix County and the State of Wisconsin cite numerous environmental interests with the regulations in question. According to the St. Croix County Zoning Board, granting the Murrs the variance could result in yet another residence with access to the river, additional steer cutting and excavating, and another sanitary system in an area with sober limiting factors. We must discuss if these environmental interests are legitimate in preventing landowners from selling. We must decide to either uphold or reverse the Appellate Courts decision that Penn Central, whose building and airspace were considered contiguous parcels, establish a rule that is applicable to the case in question. Furthermore, we must decide if under Lucas v randomness Carolina Coastal Council,5 in which the land essentially useless, the Murrs could be entitle to Monetary compensation. Congress enacted the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (Act) in 1968 to preserve certain rivers for the enjoyment of present and future generations, to wit It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States that certain selected rivers of the Nation which, with their straightaway environments, possess outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural or other similar values, shall be preserved in free-flowing condition, and that they and their immediate environments shall be entertain for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations. The Congress declares that the established field policy of dams and other construction at appropriate sections of the rivers of the United States take to be complemented by a policy that would preserve other selected rivers or sections thereof in their free-flowing condition to protect the water quality of such rivers and to fulfill other vital national conservation purposes.6 Under both cases, I suggest that we uphold the Boards original decision in 2005. As the circuit and appellate courts both stated, after the lots were placed under common ownership as contiguous parcels, they are subject to the countys afoot(predicate) zoning regulations. In 1986, Lucas bought two residential lots on the isle of Palms, a South Carolina barrier island. He intended to build single-family homes as on the adjacent lots. In 1988, the state legislature enacted a law which barred Lucas from erecting permanent habitable structures on his land. The law aimed to protect erosion and destruction of barrier islands. Lucas sued and won a large pecuniary judgment. The state appealed. Since unlike Lucas, the Murrs may build on both parcels and sell them together for a reasonable price, there is no need for compensation. Furthermore, the Countys environmental interest outweighs that of Murrs. scarce v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), a shoreland zoning ordinance established a conservancy district over wetlands within 1,000 feet of a lake and prohibit any filling without a permit. This, in effect, prevented the changing of the natural character of the land .7 The landowner asserted the ordinance was unconstitutional because it amounted to constructive taking without compensation. The court disagreed, finding the ordinance a valid exercise of the constabulary power to protect navigable waters and the public rights therein from the humiliation and deterioration which results from uncontrolled use and development of shorelands.8 In Penn Central, New York Citys line preservation interest outweighed the use of airspace as a skyscraper.V. base on the foregoing, we conclude the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the County and State of Wisconsin. The undisputed facts establish that the Murrs property, viewed as a whole, retains beneficial and practical use as a residential lot. Accordingly, we conclude they have not alleged a compensable taking as a matter of law.BibliographyBrown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).Chicago, B. Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).Kelo v. New London 545 U.S. 469 (2005).Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).Magna Carta, Chapter 39, June 15, 1215.Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).Murr v. Wisconsin, Oyez, https//www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-214 (last visited descent 19, 2016).Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 16 Wall. 36 36 (1872).United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).Village of Euclid v. Ambler real property Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).1 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).2 ibid.3 Murr v. Wisconsin, Oyez, https//www.oyez.org/cases/2 016/15-214 (last visited Dec 19, 2016).4 ibid.5 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).6 Murr v. Wisconsin, Oyez, https//www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-214 (last visited Dec 19, 2016).7 Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).8 ibid.